Violence erupted across 20 of Mexico’s 32 states on Feb. 22 when Mexican authorities announced that the head of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), “El Mencho” Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, died from injuries sustained during a military operation to arrest him.
The Mexican government’s pursuit of one of the country’s most powerful drug cartel leaders confirmed a marked policy shift by President Claudia Sheinbaum from her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. His policy of “hugs, not bullets” produced a dramatic rise in homicides and other forms of violence and allowed organized crime groups to deepen and diversify their networks with impunity.
But fully dismantling the transnational criminal networks that plague Mexico and bringing them to justice will take a major commitment from Mexican authorities. They will need to go beyond tactical successes in arresting leaders and subduing reprisals and begin investigating and prosecuting corrupt political leaders and security officials who shield criminal group activities. This will require Mexico to strengthen its democratic and judicial institutions. And it will need help from the United States, which must continue supporting the Mexican government’s fight against the cartels and pursuing cartel branches that reach into the United States.
The Trump Administration’s designation of CJNG and other cartels as foreign terrorist organizations has unlocked new resources to investigate U.S. criminals who are cooperating with the cartels. However, U.S. law enforcement agencies must be fully resourced to pursue the transnational networks that engage in money laundering, smuggling and distributing illegal narcotics, and trafficking guns and weapons into Mexico from the United States. These agencies include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the FBI, Border Patrol, and the Treasury Department.
Ongoing intelligence sharing and other security collaboration between the United States and Mexico contributed to the success of the operation against CJNG, particularly a new Interagency Task Force Counter Cartel established in January. Pressure from the United States on Mexico to act against the cartels has added momentum, but the raid on Oseguera and CJNG leaders was the product of cooperation between countries.
It’s important to recognize that the operation against El Mencho was successfully executed by Mexican authorities. Mexican Secretary of Security and Citizen Protection Omar Hamid García Harfuch had compelling reasons to oversee Oseguera’s capture: While Harfuch was police chief of Mexico City in 2020, he was nearly killed in an assassination attempt ordered by Oseguera.
Mexican government authorities must be prepared for the long-haul battle and reprisal violence. They will need a comprehensive strategy and sustained political will to remain on the offensive in the war the cartel leaders may unleash.
Mexico must enhance security for political leaders, security officials, journalists and civic actors who hold organized crime accountable but are vulnerable to intimidation, threats, and violence from the cartels. The campaign period prior to Mexico’s most recent general elections in 2024 were considered the most violent in recent history.
The extreme ineffectiveness of Mexico’s criminal justice system is another hindrance to bringing organized crime syndicates to justice. Trust in the justice system, ranked 135 out of 143 countries assessed by the World Justice Project, is so low that crimes frequently go unreported, and, even when they do, low prosecution rates reinforce a sense of impunity.
Pressure from the Mexican public and the United States government has prompted President Sheinbaum to respond to some public allegations of cartel-linked corruption, but these responses appear carefully calculated to shield political allies from serious repercussions.
There have been multiple instances in which President Sheinbaum negotiated exits for high-profile leaders within her ruling Morena party who were accused of corruption, offering “golden parachutes” to relocate them to less influential government positions, according to a recent analysis by Brookings Institution experts.
Meanwhile, it remains unclear whether Mexico’s former navy secretary will face investigation after an audio recording became public in which he discussed the specifics of a major huachicol fuel smuggling network with a rear admiral who was later assassinated for denouncing the corruption.
Finally, Mexico must also revisit so-called judicial reforms that opened the door for cartels to influence Mexico’s court system, including lowered eligibility standards and popular elections for every judge and magistrate at all levels of government. These changes make it easier for candidates with high-risk ties to organized crime to compete for judicial positions. For example, a former lawyer for the notorious drug cartel leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman was elected as a judge in Juarez last year.
Effectively combatting Mexico’s cartels and criminal organizations will require a multipronged approach that not only takes imminent security challenges into consideration, but also deeper institutional reforms.
While continuing to maintain strong pressure on President Sheinbaum and share intelligence to help Mexico combat the cartels, the United States should simultaneously target the complex web of criminal operations that distribute illegal narcotics, traffic weapons, and launder money for the cartels within U.S. borders. The United States should also prioritize support for programs aimed at preventing and treating substance use disorders to decrease U.S. demand for illicit drugs.
Citizens on both sides of the shared U.S.-Mexico border have suffered as a result of corruption, and violence unleashed by criminal organizations such as CJNG, and holding these actors to account will require ongoing commitment and collaboration from both neighbors.
