U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem visited Ecuador Nov. 5-6, where she was welcomed by President Daniel Noboa and toured two Ecuadorian military bases in Manta and Salinas.
If Ecuadorian voters elect to reverse a constitutional ban prohibiting foreign military bases in a Nov. 16 referendum, Noboa hopes the United States will consider reestablishing a security presence in the country to support the Ecuadorian government in countering transnational organized crime and narcotics trafficking that has transformed Ecuador from one of the safest countries in South America into the most violent. The United States previously managed a forward operating location for counternarcotics operations with a force of 300 military personnel at the Ecuadorian Air Force Base Eloy Alfaro in Manta from 1999-2009.
For the United States, reestablishing physical security cooperation in the country would significantly strengthen its capacity to combat drug trafficking in a key subregion of the continent. Most narcotics trafficking from South America that is destined for U.S. markets currently flows through the Pacific, and Ecuador has become a central node for cocaine transshipment and money laundering.
An on-the-ground security presence would also help the United States compete more effectively with China in a country that seeks to maintain a pragmatic relationship with both powers to diversify partnerships and leverage a wider range of potential economic benefits.
But the United States should also make this type of cooperation contingent on the degree to which Ecuador’s leadership demonstrates a commitment to preserving the integrity of its own democratic institutions, protections for human rights, and respect for the rule of law.
Amid political, social, economic, and security tensions that have made it challenging to build a steady governing coalition in the country, Noboa needs to demonstrate that he can build trust and negotiate with influential political factions that represent different sectors of Ecuador’s diverse society. The United States should ensure that an investment of its security assets would receive and maintain an enduring welcome, and that cooperation would not entangle or enable human rights abuses that could harm the United States’ effectiveness.
How Ecuador became a hub for organized crime
The roots of Ecuador’s current security crisis can be traced back to Rafael Correa’s presidency from 2007-2017. Under his leadership, Ecuador adopted a new 2008 constitution through a popular referendum that included a ban on foreign military bases and led to the closure of the U.S. military base at Manta that had been central to U.S.-led counternarcotic operations in the region. The absence of U.S. support, combined with Correa’s lack of political will to combat drug trafficking, opened the door for Ecuador to become a major transit route for cocaine and other narcotics produced in neighboring Colombia and Peru.
For decades, expert observers of drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere have cautioned about the “balloon effect” that occurs when targeting the production, manufacturing, and transportation networks that fuel the illicit narcotics economy. Like the air contained within a malleable balloon, as long as the potential for profits exists, enterprising criminals shift production and trafficking routes away from countries where pressure is being applied, into other countries where conditions are more favorable and they will face less resistance. A sustained pressure vacuum in Ecuador contributed to criminal elements moving back into the country over the years.
While organized crime has long been present in Ecuador, rising homicide rates and public displays of violence have grown exponentially since 2021. This latest wave of violence came to a head in 2023-2024, just as Noboa first took office amid intensifying competition among the gangs and other organized crime groups for power, profits, and access to Ecuador’s Pacific ports in a fractured political arena.
Why the United States should proceed with caution
As a whole, Ecuador’s civil society has generally criticized the upcoming constitutional referendum due to the process by which it was advanced to a public vote and cautioning that other proposed changes threaten to undermine the accountability of governing institutions.
Beyond the proposed reversal of the ban on foreign military bases, other ballot measures call for reducing the size of the legislature, limiting public financing for political parties, and initiating a constituent assembly to rewrite the entire constitution.
If the latter proposal advances, there is concern that Noboa could use the drafting of a new constitution to expand executive power by allowing for impeachment of Constitutional Court justices. In August, Noboa led a public demonstration against a court ruling limiting expansive security laws passed earlier this year, with high-level administration officials criticizing the high court justices as “enemies of the people.”
While the United States would have a firm legal basis to deepen its security relationship with Ecuador if its citizens vote to allow foreign militaries to operate in the country again, it should use its leverage with Ecuador to simultaneously contribute to both its physical security and the long-term stability of the country by linking additional cooperation to transparency, accountability, and respect for the rule of law.
On the whole, a greater focus by the United States on Ecuador is a smart move to demonstrate it is serious about combatting drug trafficking and organized crime that have been a destabilizing force throughout the Western Hemisphere. In September, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced two funding packages to assist Ecuador in the fight against trafficking networks and designated two of its most notorious gangs, Los Lobos and Los Choneros, as foreign terrorist organizations.
The United States could also use its leverage and the renewed relationship it has developed with Mexico’s new president, Claudia Sheinbaum, to facilitate dialogue between Mexico and Ecuador to enhance their abilities to interdict drug trafficking shipments and money laundering schemes that flow between the two countries. Under its previous president, Mexico cut off diplomatic relations in 2024 when Ecuadorian police broke international diplomatic norms by forcibly entering Mexico’s Embassy in Quito to detain a former vice president who had fled there after facing major corruption charges.
The United States could make considerable progress to combat organized crime in the hemisphere by directing security resources to assist Ecuador. But it will also be critical for the United States to balance its security objectives with other dynamics that threaten to undermine progress towards hemispheric stability.
